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Дайджест валютного рынка

Рыночные идеи, события, аналитика
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Chessplayer 12.07.2011, 15:12

Куда инвестирует Джим Роджерс ?

Поменяли ли вы что-то в своих позициях в связи с последними событиями (NFP, Италия)? – спрашивает журналист CNBC Джима Роджерса.

Where Does Jim Rogers Invest?

Я ничего не менял, я - простой человек, –отвечает Джим Роджерс.

Мои активы находятся главным образом в commodities и валютах, а мои шорты - развивающиеся рынки и американские высокотехнологичные компании.

Я также в шорте по одному крупному американскому международному банку (BofA ?). Я в шорте по американским долгосрочным казначейским облигациям.

Роджерс в лонге по доллару и евро. Доллар он предпочитает евро.

Commodities – это самое надежное по мнению Роджерса.

Если экономика будет расти – все будут покупать commodities. Если экономика не будет расти, то правительства будут печатать много денег и commodities все-равно будут расти.

Фед будет печатать деньги, поэтому лучше оставаться в commodities.

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Chessplayer 28.05.2011, 10:43

Билл Гросс: мы определенно недооценили облигации

Публично Билл Гросс пытается отрицать, что PIMCO шортит US Treasuries; это у него такие реверансы в адрес Феда и Казначейства. Но отчеты твердят свое. Возможно, это то, что он называет стратегией «безопасных спрэдов». Не вдаваясь особенно в подробности, это означает, например, лонг по германским бондам ( или даже российским) и шорт по UST.

Недавно Билл Гросс выступил на CNBC

ВЫДЕЛЮ ОСНОВНЫЕ МОМЕНТЫ ЕГО ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЯ.

Сохранение процентных ставок на низком уровне он называет «финансовыми репрессиями».

Владельцы сбережений находятся в невыгодном положении по сравнению с должниками, и это может продлиться еще 5,10,15 лет.

По поводу вопроса: Будут ли инвесторы покупать акции вместо бондов? Да, думаю, что будут, - отвечает Билл Гросс. Учитывая, что рост экономик стран G7 2%, а развивающихся 5-6%, учитывая, что реальный рост дивидендов в отдельных странах примерно 1,7-2%, учитывая, что реальная ставка доходности по 7-летним UST равна -1%.

Билл Гросс думает, что доходность 10-летних UST не упадет ниже 3%. В конце июня заканчивается QE2, если Фед не будет покупать, то исчезнет покупатель облигаций на 1 трлн. долларов в год. Кто будет покупать?

На этих уровнях, при этих негативных процентных ставках давайте посмотрим на другие страны, давайте посмотрим на корпоративные бонды, как альтернативу UST.

По поводу позиций PIMCO в облигациях:

Мы не переоценивали трежеря. Мы определенно их недооценивали, но это не означает, что мы не владеем некоторым их количеством. Германские бонды и канадские совершают ралли. Мы просто думаем, что есть лучшие альтернативы. Это не означает, что мы не испытываем определенное смущение относительно их сроков погашения. У нас хороший год... так что вы за нас не волнуйтесь.

Что мы пытаемся сделать – это найти страны, которые в меньшей степени подвергаются «финансовым репрессиям». В США процентная ствка, которая находится на уровне 25 пунктов, на 300 пунктов ниже инфляции. Такие же условия и в Великобритании, и они являются финансово репрессивными, означая, что инвесторы зарабатыват значительно меньше по сравнению с инфляцией. Нам нужны страны с лучшими условиями.

Мы продолжаем видеть рост, не только в США, но и глобальный.

Великое замедление в плане стабильности и темпов роста закончилось. В течение последних 30 лет мы имели ситуацию, когда 10-летние UST торговались близко к номинальным темпам роста ВВП ( по-видимому Билл Гросс подразумевает мировой ВВП). Прямо сейчас мы имеем 3,06%, и это может быть на 1-2% ниже темпов роста, которые продолжают расти. В этом разница... Владельцы сбережений в невыгодном положении и это заставляет их искать альтернативы.

Ниже дан полный транскрипт его ответов на вопросы на английском языке.

Gross on the implication of U.S. low borrowing rates for savers:

“It means that savers are being disadvantaged and will be disadvantaged for perhaps five, ten to fifteen years relative to debtors."

"What policymakers are trying to do is rebalance this imbalance in terms of too much debt and too attractive rates on savings. What happens since 1946 to 1979 in the UK and the U.S., in order to rebalance balance sheets, was that the U.S. basically kept interest rates at 2.5% for much of that period of time and offered substantially lower real interest rates. That is what will be done here, and basically, it is called financial repression. We call it pocket picking. We simply suggest that investors look into other areas in order to achieve returns. “

On whether consumers should buy equities instead of bonds:

“I think so. Our recent secular forum suggests a bumpy territory...to the extent that G7 countries grow at 2% and to the extent that emerging and developing grow at 5 to 6% and those are our main level assumptions, then equities do make some sense. They do offer real returns in the form of a dividend yield than can grow approximately 1.7 to 2% or more in various countries. Compare that to real rates of interest in the United States on a 7-year on a -1%.”

On whether the Treasury 10-year yield will drop below 3%:

“I don’t think so. We have the end of QE2 at the end of June and that subtracts about $1 trillion of annual purchasing power the Fed will not be buying. I would be the first to admit that there is not enough data because QE1 and QE2 was such a short period of time to suggest what might happen afterwards. I simply think that yields would probably go higher as opposed to lower if only because we wonder who will buy Treasuries when the Fed does not buy Treasuries. At these levels, at these negative real interest rates, let's look to other countries, let's look to corporate bonds as opposed to Treasuries. “

On Pimco’s position in Treasuries:

We're not overweight Treasuries. We're certainly underweight Treasuries, but that does not mean we don't own lots of other bonds. German bunds and Canadian bonds are rallying. We simply think those are better alternatives. It does not mean as well that we're not a little bit shy in terms of duration. We’re having a good year...so don't cry for Pimco.”

“What we are trying to do is find some countries that are less financially repressed...In the United States, the policy rate at 25 basis points is about 300 basis points less than inflation. That, along with the examples in the UK, are financially repressive, meaning that investors earn a substantial amount less than inflation. We want countries where we can do better than that.”

On whether he sees softening in consumption by the U.S. consumer:

“We continue to see low growth, not just in the U.S., but globally. On a domestic and global basis, I think it is clear we are not building houses for each other and there are not enough jobs to go around."

"It is not that demand is satiable -- it never is. It’s just that the financial system and the stability of existing systems to facilitate it aren’t in working order. Because of that, jobs will go to countries with the cheapest labor and policymakers will tend to make their country the labor market of choice via financial repression and currency depreciation.”

Gross on whether the Great Moderation is over:

“The Great Moderation in terms of steady and high real growth rates is over...What we experienced over the past 30 years in terms of real interest rates is a 10-year that basically traded close to nominal GDP. What we have right now is a 10-year at 3.06, which is trading perhaps 1% to 2% under nominal GDP going forward. Therein lies the difference. Savers are being disadvantaged and it pays them to look for alternatives.”

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Chessplayer 22.05.2011, 14:05

Джон Вильямс: Гиперинфляция и коллапс доллара

Эксклюзивное интервью Джона Вильямса «Гиперинфляция и коллапс доллара», создателя сайта Schadowstatistics (теневая статистика)

With so many questions surrounding the U.S. dollar and rising inflation, today King World News interviewed internationally followed John Williams of Shadowstats to get his take on the U.S. dollar, Fed and hyperinflation. When asked about the tremendous inflation globally Williams stated,

“The dollar has already been a factor for the major inflation that we are seeing now, and the weakness that we have seen in the dollar up to now has primarily been as a result of the Fed’s efforts to debase the dollar. A weaker dollar has spiked oil prices and we are seeing the highest inflation -- as the government reports it -- in the last 3 years, and it’s going to get a lot worse.”

Та слабость, которую мы видим в долларе, - прямой результат усилий Феда.

When asked if the US dollar will collapse Williams replied,

If we end up in the hyperinflation that I think we’re going to see, then, no, the dollar won’t survive. They’ll probably come up with another currency at some point as they reorganize the global currency system. For this to work I expect it to have some backing of gold in order to sell this concept to the public, but the dollar in its current form would not survive a hyperinflation.”

Доллар не переживет гиперинфляцию.

When asked about the timing of hyperinflation in the United States Williams stated,

That’s the type of thing that could happen at any time, all of the fundamentals are in place. I do think we’re going to have a dollar crisis. I can’t give you the precise timing on it, but circumstances are negative for the dollar in terms of relative political stability. When you look at our government here we can’t control the fiscal conditions. Our trade deficit is continuing to deteriorate, that’s a negative for the dollar, inflation is rising on a relative basis, that’s a negative for the dollar.

Что-то подобное гиперинфляции может случиться в любой момент, так как все необходимые фундаментальные факторы присутствуют.

The Fed although it is officially ending QE2, most likely is going to come back with a QE3 and that will debase the dollar and if we are going to debase the dollar the rest of the world generally is not going to want to hold it.”

Хотя официально Фед заканчивает QE2, очень вероятно его возвращение с QE3.

When asked how quickly could we see a dollar collapse Williams responded, “It could happen very quickly, but they (the Fed) will try to forestall it as much as they can. When you do get a real panic it may not be containable. In terms of the hyperinflation I don’t think it will be held off beyond 2014. What we’re now seeing in the pickup in inflation here eventually will be seen as the beginnings of it.”

Коллапс доллара может случиться очень быстро, хотя Фед будет стараться предупредить его настолько, насколько он может. Не думаю, что гиперинфляция настанет позднее 2014 года. Сейчас мы видим ее зарождение.

На что будет похожа гиперинфляция в Америке и какие последствия она будет иметь ?

When asked what hyperinflation would be like in the U.S. Williams had this to say, “This is not going to be a happy circumstance in any event. You look at what happened in Zimbabwe, the terrible hyperinflation there, which is probably the worst ever seen in any country, it took place over a couple of years. The economy still continued to function to some degree, people still went to work, and the reason they were able to do that is they had a backup black market in US dollars. We don’t have anything like that here.

Efforts to introduce gold as a second currency would effectively provide that, but there’s nothing in place at the moment that would be a backup. So you have the likelihood of disruption to normal commerce. If the distribution chain to grocery stores gets interrupted, and the shelves are bare of food, that’s the kind of thing that can trigger rioting in the streets.”

When asked what people should do to protect themselves Williams said, “First you need to look to preserve your wealth and assets, and the primary hedge is physical gold, but silver is in that category as well. I’d look to get some assets outside the US dollar, outside the US if you can. Stronger alternative currencies are the Swiss Franc, Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar.

For people living inside of the U.S. if you are going to have a disrupted system, this is a manmade disaster, not a natural disaster, but it’s the type of thing you should prepare for as you would a natural disaster. Have several months of canned goods, other staples that you need to survive. And assuming that we see this evolve into some type of barter system, build up a stock of goods that you think are barter-able.”

Гиперинфляция, возможно, не будет иметь столь ужасный вид, как в Зимбабве, поскольку там существовал огромный черный рынок в американских долларах.

Последствия: Вы увидите разрушение нормальных условий коммерции. Распределительные цепочки в бакалейные магазины будут порваны и полки магазинов опустеют. Подобное развитие событий может вызвать беспорядки на улицах.

Как защитить себя?

Прежде всего необходимо защитить себя и свои активы и важнейший хедж – физическое золото. Серебро тоже из этой категории. Я бы также рассматривал некоторые активы за пределами доллара США, за пределами США вообще, если хотите. Сильными альтернативными валютами являются швейцарский франк, австралийский и канадский доллар.

Внутри США это может быть бедствие, не природное бедствие, но вы должны быть готовы к нему, как к природному бедствию. Имейте запасы на несколько месяцев продуктов и других жизненно необходимых вещей. И имея в виду, что мы увидим некоторый тип развития бартерных отношений, создайте запас товаров, которые вы рассматриваете как подходящие для обмена.

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Chessplayer 19.05.2011, 19:43

Goldman Sachs о фундаментальной слабости доллара

Курс доллара является главным фундаментальным фактором для финансовых рынков. Потому интересно знать соображения относительно американской валюты наиболее активного и наиболее афиллированного с американскими монетарными властями финансового игрока - Goldman Sachs.

Прогнозы по доллару от Goldman Sachs неутешительны: доллар фундаментально слаб.

  • We have changed our forecasts to project more Dollar weakness.
  • Since the last revisions to our forecasts, the Dollar decline has roughly tracked the expected path.
  • Large structural imbalances in the US are highlighted by weakness in the tradable goods sector.
  • The outlook for monetary policy differentials and BBoP trends remains USD-negative.
  • Dollar weakness is common during periods with slowing GLI momentum.
  • We now see EUR/$ at 1.45, 1.50 and 1.55 in 3, 6 and 12 months, and $/JPY at 82, 82 and 86.

Since we moved to a more explicit Dollar weakening path last autumn, FX markets have broadly followed the expected trajectory. In many cases, the Dollar has now weakened well beyond our near-term forecasts and the driving forces of continued gradual depreciation are intact. We review the key arguments behind our view and focus specifically on Dollar performance in the context of the global business cycle and the latest BBoP trends. Our major FX forecasts are revised to reflect continued further USD weakness.

1. мы меняем наши прогнозы, продполагая большую слабость доллара 2. снижение доллара достаточно хорошо соответствовало нашему последнему прогнозу 3. крупные структурные дисбалансы выдвигаются на первый план слабостью в секторе торгуемых товаров 4. прогноз дифференциалов процентных ставок и баланса платежей остаются негативными для доллара 5. в моменты замедления глобальной промышленной активности доллар как правило слаб

6. Мы видим eurousd на 1,45, 1,50, 1,55, и usdjpy на 82, 82, 86 через 3,6, 12 месяцев соответственно.

5 фундаментальных факторов, которые имеют существенное значение для слабости доллара

  • The structural current account deficit causes constant external funding pressures. For the Dollar to stabilise or even to rally, investors need to be convinced of the case for additional long-term investments in the US.
  • With unemployment still high, fiscal consolidation looming and continued weakness in the real estate sector, the growth outlook remains less compelling in the US than in many other regions or countries. This makes it even more difficult to fund the current account deficit with investment inflows.
  • The cyclical factors discussed in the previous point suggest this it is also highly likely that Fed policy will remain more accommodative than in most other countries. Interest rate differentials will likely remain USD-negative.
  • The case for Dollar depreciation will strengthen as fiscal policy becomes increasingly tight in the US. The likelihood of early monetary policy tightening would also decline with tighter fiscal policy, as highlighted by our US economists.
  • Structural and EM-related upward pressures on crude prices add to the imbalances. All else equal, real disposable income in the US would decline and, hence, so would domestic demand, adding to cyclical headwinds. Moreover, the rising fuel bill would increase the nominal trade gap and therefore the external funding needs.

Ни один из вышеуказанных пяти факторов не дает намеков на возможное изменение в пользу доллара.

Дефицит платежного баланса вызывает постоянное давление внешнего фондирования. Для того, чтобы доллара стабилизировался или совершил ралли, необходимо, чтобы инвесторы были убеждены в целесообразности долгосрочного инвестирования в США.

Главная причина ослабления доллара – значительное падение производственного сектора и занятости в нем за последние 10 лет. Это стало результатом действия двух сил:

  • First, the competition from interest rate sensitive domestic sectors during the credit boom in the US, in particular real estate related sectors.
  • Second, aggressive offshoring and the relocation of factories to the rest of the world, in particular Asia, has led to the disappearance of whole manufacturing industries in the US.

1. Конкуренция со стороны сектора недвижимости 2. агрессивное размещение производств за рубежом.

Объяснение, почему это происходило:

There have recently been some signs of strength in the manufacturing sector, in particular strong ISM surveys and some persistent hiring in the manufacturing sector. But the rate of job growth in this sector remains very low compared with the losses over the last 10 years. From 2001 to the trough of the credit crisis, US employment in the manufacturing sector has fallen by about 5mn to 11mn, at a rate of about 52,000 per month on average. Since then, we have seen renewed hiring of about 13,000 per month on average. In other words, job growth in the US manufacturing sector currently runs at only 25% of the pace of job destruction seen over the last decade.

This weakness in the manufacturing sector is also still clearly reflected in the external balance. The real trade deficit currently runs at about $50bn per month (in 2005 Dollars). Broken down by sectors, auto related and consumer goods sectors account for about $40bn, again highlighting the weakness in tradable goods.

In terms of outlook, our US economists expect a gradual further widening of the real US trade deficit in terms of GDP, which will likely keep the downside pressures for the Dollar firmly in place.

Lastly, it is also important not to mix level and change effects. The Dollar downside pressures will likely subside only after the external deficits have narrowed substantially. In practical terms, this means a substantial amount of manufacturing capacity has to be shifted back to the US, and this is a very slow process that is typically measured in years rather than quarters.

We are confident this adjustment will ultimately happen, but in the meantime it may be necessary for the Dollar to drift lower until relocation to the US becomes a very clear case. The undervaluation of about 12% relative to our trade-weighted GSDEER model may therefore become more pronounced in the foreseeable future.

Прогнозы GS по доллару и йене следующие:

Taken together, the points above suggest there is still considerable downside potential in the USD. We therefore are revising our forecasts to reflect this ongoing trend. In particular, we are now projecting EUR/$ at 1.45, 1.50 and 1.55 in 3, 6 and 12 months. We now see $/JPY at 82, 82 and 86, which, compared with our previous forecasts, also reflects more broad USD weakness—albeit within the recent range.

Our views, as outlined across our macro and market research, remain constructive on Europe. Markets have long expected some form of liability management for Greece, and so a lot of bad news is already priced in. That said, reform progress in systemically important Spain continues at a steady pace. With contagion effects from the Greek debt debate limited, we think the recent correction likely represents an opportunity to position for Dollar weakness versus the Euro.

Риском для медвежьего прогноза являются следующие факторы:

  • First, a much faster structural rebalancing of the US economy than we currently expect would fundamentally change the picture, although the hurdle seems very high for this to happen in the near term.
  • Second, a period of broad-based asset weakness would likely still translate into Dollar strength given the prevailing correlations.
  • Finally, there are still concerns about the European sovereign situation. Although not directly a factor for the US economy, a substantial deterioration of the sovereign debt situation in Europe would support the Dollar, mainly because it would weigh on the Euro.

1. Более быстрая реорганизация экономики США, 2. период общей слабости активов в силу существующей корреляции усилит доллар 3. ухудшение ситуации с суверенным долгом в Европе поддержит доллар ввиду его высокого веса в евро.

Наиболее интересная часть касается портфельного инвестирования в US

As we stated above, one of the core reasons behind our Dollar view rests on a Fed that is more dovish than other central banks. Our official forecast for the first Fed hike is not until 2013, which is significantly below what the market is currently pricing. The second important factor behind our Dollar views is the growing current account deficit and the possible deterioration in funding inflows. Foreign flows into US assets other than US Treasuries have remained very weak, possibly affected by the negative returns following the ‘tech bubble’ until 2000 and the subsequent housing bubble in 2004/07.

Фед наиболее мягко настроен среди всех ЦБ. Официальный прогноз GS повышения ставок со стороны Феда – не раньше 2013 года.

During the pre-crisis period, for which we use 1H2007 as an example, monthly net inflows into US Treasuries averaged $19bn, inflows into agencies were just shy of $30bn, into corporate bonds they were an impressive $48bn, and into US equities they amounted to $24bn, making a total around $117bn on average per month. That picture has shifted dramatically. On average in 2010, net foreign flows into Treasuries rose to just shy of $60bn per month, while net foreign flows into US agency debt were on average only $9bn per month. Net foreign flows into US corporate debt were down to -$1.1bn on average in 2010, i.e., an outflow, while flows into US equities were just $9bn. Net foreign inflows across assets had therefore shrunk to $76bn on average per month in 2010, from $117bn in 1H2007, and the composition of inflows has shifted dramatically away from agencies, corporate debt and equities, towards US Treasuries. Looking at the most recently released data for March 2011, this shift remains firmly in place, with foreigners continuing to shy away from US assets other than Treasuries. Moreover, US investors have recently accelerated purchases of foreign assets again, with the latest March number hinting at a sizable outflow of more than $30bn from that source. Net portfolio inflows therefore remain very weak in general.

There are two additional issues worth mentioning. First, given the low interest rate environment, we think that hedge ratios for foreign inflows into US Treasuries are now relatively high. This means that these inflows are not as Dollar-positive as a similar inflow into US equities. Second, foreign official buying (largely by central banks in emerging markets) constitutes, on our estimates, the bulk of net foreign purchases of US Treasuries. The official breakout by the TIC data here suggests that—of the $60bn in foreign net purchases of Treasuries per month in 2010—about $44bn reflect foreign official buying. This number is likely a lower bound estimate, since foreign central banks may also be purchasing US Treasuries through intermediaries. We highlight the importance of official buying because these purchases are in some sense ‘passive’, i.e., they reflect the decision by some emerging markets to peg their currencies to the Dollar. As a result, they mechanically have to buy US Treasuries to neutralise appreciation pressure on their currencies. These inflows to the US are therefore not driven necessarily by the same motives as foreign flows into US equities (such as growth expectations and/or the profit motive). For both of these reasons, we see the shift to Treasury purchases by foreigners as a development highlighting the difficulty in funding the US trade deficit, and in line with our view for further Dollar weakness.

Официальные покупки (главным образом со стороны ЦБ развивающихся стран) составляют львиную долю иностранных приобретений UST и составляют примерно 60%.

Аналитики GS подчеркивают важность официальных покупок UST: они отражают желание EM прикрепить свою валюту к доллару. Как результат, им приходится автоматически покупать доллары, чтобы нейтрализовать повышательное давление на собственные валюты. Эти притоки капитала не выводятся потом по тем же причинам, что и капитал на рынке акций. Рост доли иностранного государственного капитала подчеркивает сложность в фондировании торгового дефицита США и отражает тенденцию усиления слабости доллара.

Предыдущие прогнозы Goldman Sachs на блоге:

19 мая Взгляд Gоldman Sachs на US Treasuries

17 мая Голдман все еще смотрит конструктивно на евро и, следовательно, на рискованные активы

15 апреля Goldman Sachs понижает прогноз по индексу S&P500 на 2011 год

12 апреля Goldman Sachs закрывает длинные позиции по ряду сырьевых товаров

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Chessplayer 17.05.2011, 11:23

Голдман все еще смотрит конструктивно на евро и, следовательно, на рискованные активы

В десятых числах апреля аналитическая команда Goldman Sachs начала кошмарить рынки рискованных активов (нефть, металлы, акции, высокорискованные валюты), и вслед за этим произошел разворот в US Treasuries, а чуть позднее и сами рискованные активы начали коррекцию.

Я писал об этом здесь и здесь

Мы увидели фиксацию в металлах, нефти 10-30%. Странным образом это совпало с беспрецедентной серией повышений гарантийного обеспечения на COMEX и других биржах.

Теперь, похоже, они начинают менять свое видение рынка.

Вот новые рекомендации:

Moreover, we remain structurally constructive on cyclical assets, including stocks and oil, which in turn suggests there could be further upside in the Euro, induced from cross asset correlations.

Overall, we remain committed to our view that EUR/$ will move higher again. From a tactical trading point of view, it obviously hurts that we decided to not lock in potential gains when we almost reached our 1.50 target. But with our fundamental views still firmly in place we continue to remain positioned for a renewed EUR/$ rally.

Голдман ждет дальнейшего роста euro/usd. Из тактических соображений они не закрывали свой лонг по евро, когда тот достиг цели на 1,50. То есть GS принял практически движение в 10 фигур против их позиции!

С фундаментальной точки зрения они ждут возобновления ралли.

Разъяснение их позиции по поводу европейского долгового кризиса и евро

Obviously, the last couple of days have been dominated - once again - by the concerns about sovereign debt in Europe, and in particular in Greece. It appears FX markets and the Euro play the role of a safety valve with investors buying protection in case the sovereign situation gets notably worse. The latest IMM data indicates the notable drop in EUR longs and USD shorts as of last Tuesday. Since then, the skew in EUR/$ risk reversals has become more biased towards EUR/$ puts, which suggests that speculative positioning may now be outright short.

Having said this, apart from the Euro, things seem to stabilise otherwise. Greek 2yr yields have been stable, slightly below 24 percent for about 3 weeks and this despite no peripheral bond purchases by the ECB within the SMP program in recent weeks. Greek stocks appear to be stabilising at low levels as well, having been on a downtrend for several months.

Moreover, when looking at other peripheral countries, and in particular much larger Spain, we detect an increase in volatility and choppy ranges but little evidence of fear-dominated price action. The sovereign spreads between Spain and the core countries of the Eurozone has actually declined over the last week and remains well within the range seen throughout most of the year.

The fiscal adjustment in Greece is obviously painful and it is therefore understandable that there will be periods of reform fatigue. And during these periods, negotiations about additional support are understandable. We are going through one of these periods currently, but this does not change our underlying view that the Eurozone has the ability and will to deal with its problems.

Moreover, the news flow over much of last week indicates continued strong political commitment to Eurozone membership in our view. Together with the financial, fiscal and economic strength of the Eurozone as a whole, the situation in the small countries Greece, Ireland and Portugal is highly unlikely to be genuine threat to the Euro.

We once again come to the conclusion that the fiscal risk premium will likely decline after the recent increase.

On the other hand the rapidly approaching debt ceiling in the US, likely to be hit by the middle of summer, has the potential to lead to a notable increase in the Dollar's fiscal risk premium - in particular if the political haggling about the consolidation path continues without producing tangible results. Moreover, as the latest US Weekly highlights, substantial fiscal consolidation could leave the Fed in a position where rate increases would be unlikely for a very long time to come.

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